ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Against any injury or wrong from mere wilfulness, caprice, or
favoritism on the part of the majority owners of a ship, the master
contracting can protect himself by bond, covenant, or otherwise;
and if he neglect thus to guard his interests, himself, not the law,
should he blame, if his employers dismiss him at a moment's
notice, and without (so far as he may know or is entitled to know)
any cause, reasonable or unreasonable.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.'
2
SUPREM E COURT OF KANSAS.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.

s

CONTRAcT.

Penal.y and Liquidated Damages.-Wherethere was a written agreement that one party would furnish and the other take all the crude
turpentine made on a certain plantation when delivered in lots of forty
barrels and pay for the lots on delivery, and if either party failed he
should forfeit $1000, field, that the $1000 is to be considered a penalty
and not liquidated damages, and on a failure of either party the actual
damages are all that can be recovered : Lee, ITl 1lCo.
v. Overstreet,
1 &
42 or 43 Ga.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Sale with Ittent to defraud C,'editors-InnocentPrclaser.- hen
one party sells goods with the intent to defraud his creditors, but the
other party purchases them in good faith and without notice of such
fraudulent intent, the purchaser obtains a good title to the goods : Die8 Kans.
fendorf v. Oliver et al.,
In such a case if the purchaser pays for the goods by giving to a
third person his negotiable promissory notes (four in number) he is not
thereafter indebted to the person from whom he purchased the goods.
After .two of the notes have been paid, but before the other two have
become due, which other two still remain in the. hands of a person who
took themi with notice of the fraudulent intent of the person who sold
the goods, the giver of the notes cannot be garnisheed by the creditors
of the person who sold the goods : Id.
EVIDENCE.

Declarations.-Declarations to be admissible as part of the res gestse
I From J. II. Thomas, Esq., to appear in 42 or 43 Georgia Reports.
2 From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 8 Kansas Reports.
s From lion. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in Vol. 61 of his Reports.
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must be contemporaneous with some principal fact which they serve to
qualify or explain: State v. .Montgomery, 8 Kans.
FRAUDS,

STATUTE OF.

Estate in Land by Operation of Law not within.-While sect. 8 of
the act concerning conveyances (Gen. Stat. 180)., sects. 5 and 6 of the
act relating to frauds and perjuries (Gen. Stat. 505), and sect. 1 of the
act concerning trusts and powers (Gen. Stat. 1096) make void every
parol agreement which attempts to create an estate in lands, yet said
sections do not make void an estate which results or which is created
by operation of law: Moore v. Wade, 8 Kans.
HIGHWAY.
Dedicationto Public Ue.-A mere project or plat of land upon paper,
laying off streets, blocks and houses in a city, is not itself h dedication
of the streets to public use, and when there is a proposition to the city
authorities to receive and adopt said s.treets, as public streets, the dedication is not complete unless the authorities affirmatively receive and
adopt the same, and this must appear by the minutes of the council:
Parsons et al. v. The Atlanta University., 42 or 43 Ga.
In the absence of any formal acceptance by the public authorities of
a dedicatioh of a street,'there must be clear proof of a continrous-and
notorious use for a reasonable time by the public to constitute an acceptance : Id.
Where there is a controversy pending between the public authorities
and a citizen as to the existence or non-existence! of a public street, and
the public authorities are temporarily enjoined by bill from opening the
same, it is not competent for private citizens, as such, to file'a new bill
pending the other, to enjoin the obstruction of the street, unless they
show some special damages to themselves from said obstruction, different
from the injury to the public: -d.
HUSBAND

AND WIFE.

Judgment-Partynot served.-A husband cannot, without authority
from his wife, acknowledge service of a summons for her: Moore v.
Wade, 8 Kans.
A judgment rendered against a party who has not been served with
summons, and who has not made any appearance in the case, is erroneous : Id.
A judgment determining that a woman has no right or interest in a
certain piece of land, except such as she may have by virtue of being
the wife of a certain man, is a judgment affecting her substantial
rights: Id.
Power of Wife to Contract-Right to LEarnings.-By virtue of the
Statutes of 1860 and 1862, relative to the rights of married women, a
married woman may make bargains, carry on any trade or business, and
perform labor and services on her own separate account, and for her own
exclusive benefit, the same as though she were unmarried; and all the
earnings and profits belong to her exclusively, and are her sole and separate estate: Foster et al. v. Conger, 61 Barb.
""Capacityto sve and be sued.-She may also sue and be sued, upon
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any and all bargains, obligations, and liabilities made or incurred in her
business, the same as though she were sole: Id.
Actions and Judgments against.-Ifan action is brought against her,
in reference to her business, it is brought in the same manner as against
any other individual. The liability is personal, and if judgment is
obtained upon it, it is a personal judgment, to be enforced against any
property she may have liable to execution, as in ordinary eases: Id.
If, in such an action, the plaintiff would be entitled to judgment
were the defendant a single woman, he is entitled to it though she be
married. The obligation and the liability of the wife in such a case are
the same precisely, as though she had never contracted marriage : Id.
It is not of the slightest consequence, in respect to the plaintiff's right
of action, and to recover a judgment against the defendant, that she
had no separate estate before engaging in the business in which the
debt was contracted, nor that the debt was not contracted for the benefit
of a separate estate afterwards acquired by her: Id.
When. a wife by the consent of her husband makes a contract for
her own labor, in which contract it is agreed that she is herself to receive
the compensation, she may under our laws sue and recover in her own
name: .Merriwetherv. Smith, 42 or 43 Ga.
INJUNCTION.

There is no precedent for an injunction to restrain acts, on the ground
that they may possibly or probably result in forming and casting a cloud
upon the title of a party. Per JOHNSON, J. : Phelps v. The City of
Watertown, 61 Barb.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

A cause of action to recover damages for fraudulent representations
made upon a sale of real estate, in regard to encumbrances, accrues the
moment the bargain is completed by the conveyance of the premises to
the purchaser; and unless an action is commenced within six years from
that time, it will be barred by the Statute of Limitations: Northrop v.
Hill, 61 Barb.
It is of no consequence whatever that the purchaser did not discover
the fraud within the six years. Even though the vendor or his agent
conceals the defect of title, that will not prevent the statute from running: .
In such a case it is the act of misrepresentation, and not the resulting
damages which constitutes the cause of action: _1.
MORTGAGE.

Deed absolute on its Face-ortgageneed not he to secure a Debt.A deed of laud absolute upon its face, if taken as a security, is only a
mortgage: Moore v. Wade, 8 Kans.
While it may not be sufficient to show by parol eviaence that a deed
absolute upon its face was understood or intended or agreed to be a
mortgage, or was understood or intended or agreed to be defeasible, yet
it has always been sufficient in a court of equity to show a state of facts
outside of the deed, which would render the deed a mortgage, or would
: Id.
render the deed defeasible
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It is not necessary that a mortgage shall always be given to secure the
Spayment of a debt. It may be given to secure the performance of any
other act which the law permits to be performed: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Supervisory Power of Courts of Equi&t.-Oourts of equity have no
general supervisory power over the government of municipal corporations, or over the acts and proceedings of their governing bodies:
Phe ps v. Te City of Watertown, 61 Barb.
It was never the province of a court of equity to interfere, in such
cases, between the individual citizen and the nmunicipal authority, except
where it is shown by the complaint that the rights of the person prosecuting have been either injured or menaced in a matter falling under
some recognised head of equity, and which it is the peculiar province
of a court of equity to prevent or redress : Id.
Restraining them from the Prosecution of a -Public.Work, &c.-In
an action brought against a city corporation and others, by a resident
and tax-payer of said city, the complaint alleged that the city authorities
had entered into a contract with the other defendants to make certain
improvements in the streets of the city; that the contractors, as the
work progressed, were paid in drafts upon the city treasurer; that the
work was still being prosecuted, and other drafts about to be given; that
the city authorities had no power to make such contract, or to give such
drafts; and that the contract and drafts were void. The plaintiff prayed
for a perpetual injunction, restraining the further prosecution of the
work and the issuing of further drafts; that the contract might be
declared void, and the contractors ordered to surrender, and be enjoined
from transferring the drafts. The complaint did not show that the
plaintiff's premises had been interfered with, nor that any assessment
had been made or tax levied to raise funds to meet the drafts. Held,
that the facts stated did not constitute any cause of action against the
defendants, in favor of the plaintiff, nor give him any title to the relief
demanded: Id.
NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENT.

An obligation which, though called a bond, is payable to a person
named therein, CCor to his certain attorney, executors, administrators or
assigns," belongs to that class of obligations which has been expressly
held, in this state, not to be specialties, but in the nature of commercial
paper, negotiable by delivery under an assignment in blank: Blake v.
The Board of Supervisors of Livingston County, 61 Barb.
An action upon such an obligation is to be governed, in all respects,
by the rules applicable to commercial paper: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

A charge by one partner against another for his personal services in
superintending and managing the affairs of the !partnership, cannot be
sustained and allowed, without proof of an express agreement that compensation should be allowed for such services: L.Yon et al., EKx'rs v.
Snyder, 61 Barb.
RECONSTRUCTION.

Acts of Congress.-Appointments under the Reconstruction Acts of
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Congress to civil office by the general commanding were not by virtue
of the Constitution of the state, but by the power of the Acts of Congress, and did not confer upon the incumbents any title to the same
longer than the acts themselves were in force: Stone v. Wetmore, 42
or 43 Ga.
General Terry did not by his removal of Wetmore as the Ordinary
of Chatham county and appointment of Stone thereto, convey such title
to the office, as upon the application of Stone to the civil courts, they
could enforce under the Constitution and laws of this state : Id.
That Stone, after the removal of Wetmore by General Terry, was
appointed to the office and filed his bond and was commissioncd by the
governor, did not confer such a right to the office as courts can recogise. The commisiion did not convey more than the order of appointment upon which it was based, and that appointment expired with the
powers that gave it existence : Id.
SUNDAY.

When a contract for labor was entered into on the Sabbath, and the
contract was performed afterwards by the laborer, the promissor cannot
defend by setting forth the illegality of the contract: Mlterriwether v.
Smith, 42 or 43 Ga.
TROVER.
Prescription.-When a defendant relies on his title by prescription
he cannot tack to his own possession the possession of prior holders
of the property, unless hd shows the character of that possession, as to
its good faith, &c., and that he holds under the parties so having bond
fide acquired possession: Worthy v. Kinaman et al., 42 or 43 Ga.
Title by capture during a war can only be set up by the organized and
recognised parties to the war, or by those claiming and acquiring title
from said organized and recognised parties : Id.
WAIVER.
The mere occupation of a building by the owner, is not a waiver of
strict performance by the builder. The question of waiver' is one of
intention, depending on the circumstances: Wells v. Selicood, 61 Barb.
WARRANTY.
Action for Breach of.-In case of a breach of warranty on the sale
of goods, the buyer may bring his action at once, founding it on such
breach without returning the goods; but his continued possession of the
goods, and their actual value, will be considered in estimating the damages: Wells v. Selwood, 61 Barb.
Reasonable Time for Examination by Purchaser.-If,upon a breach
of warranty on a sale of property which does not turn out to be of as
good a quality as warranted, and continues to grow worse with the lapse
of time, the purchaser is to be charged with its true value, he ought to
have the right at any time within the limitation of the statute to see
how worthless it will become. He is entitled to a reasonable time for

400
examination.
referee: Id.
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What is a reasonable time, is matter of evidence for the
WATERS AND WATERCOIJRSES.

S ring-Rights of 'Owner.-Every owner of land has the right .to
clean out and tube or wall .up a natural spring upon his own land, for
his own use and convenience, when he does not' thereby, change the
natural course of the flow of the water therefrom, and makes no change
to the injury of another, except what may result from an'increased flow
of water in: the natural channel and outlet of such spring: Waffle v.
Porter, 61 Barb.
To do so is not such a wrongful use of the easement or abuse of the
right as will give a right of action to the owner of the serviefnt estate:
Id.
There being a living spring upon the defendant's premises, above
the plaintiffs land, which spring was'suriounded by ,gwet,-marshy piece
of ground, the natural outlet and watercourse for such marsh and spring
being over plaintiffs land; the defendant dug out the spring and placed
therein a curb or tube, About four inches above the surfece a hole was
cut in the curb for the escape of the -water. The -water never -overflowed the 'Curb nor rose above the hole, but ran constantly rrom the
hole in larger or smaller volume as the season varied., "'eld,'that-the
natural outlet and watercourse from this spring having been always
through the plaintiff's land, the 'defendant had an easement there for the
flow of that water; Id.
Reld, 'also, that it was the defendant's watercourse, and if, by reason
of the improvement of the spring, an additional" quantity of water was
made to pass through it, at certain seasons of the year, to the'plaintiff's
injury, it was. damnum absgue injuria :'.Id.
A partner, who has assigned all his interest in the copartnership-to copartner, is not a competent witness to prove an agreement that a partner, since deceased, should be allowed a compensation for his services in
managing the affairs of the partnership,'ia an adtion brought by the
executors of such deceased partner against the assignee for an accounting, &c. L4on et al., Ex'rs, v. Snyder, 61 Barb
..
In an action by an executrix, upon a promissory note inade by one
of the defendants, and endorsed to the.testator by the others, the maker
is an incompetent witness, as between the defendants and the plaintiff,
to prove that the note, atthe time it was niade, was infdited with usury,
or that the time of payment had been 'extdnded y an agreement between
the testator, in his lifetime, and the witness,' without the consent of the
endorsers: Genet, E 'x, v. .awyer, 61 Barb.
Where an action is commenced, upon a promissory note, against the
maker and endorsers, by the service; upbn all, of, a summons in which
all are named, the maker. is elearly.a !. party" to the action. The fact
that he does not appear nor put in an' answer, bu suffers default, does
not operate to sever the action, or to discontinue, it, as to him. And
being a party, he is an incompetent witness against the plaintiff suing
as executrix, in respect to transactidns between him and the testator: Id.

